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On June 8, 2006, the FDA approved the vaccine Gardisil, which protects women from 
the Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) that is linked to 99 percent of all cervical cancers.  
Immediately, forty-one state legislatures began entertaining initiatives that would 
make the vaccine mandatory for all fifth and sixth grade girls in public schools.  HPV 
suddenly went from a non-issue to one that catapulted itself onto the public and 
political agenda.  The vaccine’s producer, Merck & Co., encouraged this flurry of 
activity through its marketing and lobbying efforts.  This project seeks to understand 
the agenda setting and policy adoption processes associated with the HPV vaccine.  
The results indicate that despite the millions of dollars spent promoting its vaccine, 
Merck’s attempts to influence policy actually decreased the likelihood of policy 
adoption. 
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Introduction 
On June 8, 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) gave its seal of 
approval to Gardasil, a vaccine that protects women from the Human Papilloma Virus 
(HPV), a sexually transmitted infection that has been identified as the cause of nearly 
all cervical cancers (World Health Organization 2006).  Merck & Co., producer of the 
vaccine, quickly sprung into action, lobbying state legislatures to pass laws to make 
the vaccine mandatory.  In September 2006, Michigan became the first state to 
introduce legislation (National Conference of State Legislatures 2008).  Many other 
states followed suit, entertaining initiatives to make the vaccine compulsory for 
young girls.  By early 2008, 41 states had proposed legislation “requiring young girls 
to be vaccinated, or schools to inform parents about the vaccine” (Wilson 2007, para. 
5; National Conference of State Legislatures 2008).   
The quick and extensive launch of HPV onto state policy agendas deserves 
attention.  Many of these bills were withdrawn, died in committee, or were voted 
down, creating even more of a puzzle.  Despite many states’ initial enthusiasm, 
legislation pertaining to the HPV vaccine quickly disappeared.  This could be 
attributed to Merck’s inability to control the issue definition.  As issue salience 
increased, the debate entered the realm of morality politics.  Understanding what 
prompted 41 states to rush to action on the HPV vaccine issue and then, within a 
matter of months, abandon the policies is the primary focus of this paper.  I focus on 
the efforts of Merck & Co. to promote the new HPV vaccine through the framework 
of interest group influence in issues of morality, with the goal of unraveling the 
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relative influence of economic interests, morality influences, and public health 
concerns on state legislative activity.  This paper proceeds in four parts, beginning 
with a discussion of the politics behind the HPV vaccine and state legislation 
addressing it.  Second, I examine relevant literature from interest group and morality 
politics scholarship.  Next, I outline methods and test my research question.  Finally, I 
discuss the results and explore areas of future research.   
The Politics of HPV 
In 2004, Merck & Co. was forced to pull its arthritis pain medication, Vioxx, 
off the market after it was linked to an increased risk of heart attacks and strokes 
(Smith 2006).  Not only did Merck lose its “cash cow,” which pulled in 
approximately $2.5 billion each year, the incident caused the company’s stock value 
to take a dive, dropping nearly 27 percent (Rubin 2004).  Analysts estimate that in the 
end, Merck could see between $30 and $50 billion in costs from its Vioxx problem 
(Smith 2006).  The loss of Vioxx was not Merck’s only setback.  In June 2006, the 
company’s patent expired for Zocor, Merck’s top-selling drug to reduce cholesterol.  
Zocor alone was responsible for approximately $4.4 billion in sales each year (Smith 
2006).  Merck’s new HPV vaccine, had the potential to fill the void left by these two 
top-selling drugs, and the FDA approval of Gardasil in June 2006 could not have 
come at a better time for the pharmaceutical company. 
On the heels of these developments, adversity, and setbacks, it seems no 
surprise that Merck quickly began to campaign to have the new HPV vaccination 
mandated (Wilson 2007).  With the number of women in the United States affected 
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by HPV and cervical cancer growing each year, it seems that Merck’s vaccine could 
not have come at a better time.  Not only did Gardasil present a solution to an ever-
growing health concern, but it also provided a solution for Merck’s financial woes.     
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2006), HPV 
affects around 20 million people, making it the most prevalent sexually transmitted 
infection in the United States.  The CDC (2006) also estimates that the number of 
infected individuals grows by 6.2 million each year, making it the “second leading 
cancer killer of women worldwide” (National Conference of State Legislatures 2008, 
para. 3).  Nearly 99 percent of all cervical cancers are caused by HPV (World Health 
Organization 2006).  Gardasil protects women from the four most common strains of 
HPV, which account for 70 percent of all cervical cancer incidence (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2006).   
 Although cervical cancer incidence and mortality rates in the United States are 
lower than any other country in the world due to early screening methods, estimates 
put the mortality rate of cervical cancer in the U.S. between 3,700 and 4,000 per year 
(National Conference of State Legislatures 2008; Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 2006).  Cervical cancer continues to affect an estimated 26,000 women 
each year.  This number is continuously growing with approximately 10,000 more 
women diagnosed each year. 
With ever-growing rates of HPV and cervical cancer, the introduction of 
Gardasil had the potential to ameliorate a public health problem and potentially solve 
Merck’s financial woes.  Merck’s marketing strategy included an “aggressive 
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lobbying campaign” and increased campaign contributions which prompted 41 states 
to consider laws that would require school-aged girls to be vaccinated or would 
mandate that schools inform parents about the vaccine (Wilson 2007, para. 5; 
National Conference of State Legislatures 2008; Annenberg 2007).  Merck found 
strong support in Women in Government, a national, bipartisan organization of 
women state legislators, which serves as an educational and networking resource for 
female policymakers (Drug Week 2006, para. 6).  It was this link to Women in 
Government, however, that contributed to Merck’s campaign backfire.  In early 2007, 
the news media began to cover the connection, reporting that Merck had “funneled 
money through Women in Government” to lobby state legislators (Associated Press 
2007, para. 7; Gold 2007).  The Associated Press also revealed that a prominent 
executive from the pharmaceutical company’s vaccine department held a seat on the 
business council for Women in Government (Associated Press 2007).   
As Merck’s relationship with Women in Government began to receive media 
attention, opposition groups became involved in the debate.  This opposition 
primarily came from traditional, conservative activists who argued that the 
vaccination would “promote sexual promiscuity” and that Gardasil had not yet been 
“proven safe” (Wilson 2007, para. 2; Gold 2007).  In addition, Merck received 
criticism from public health officials who were concerned that the pharmaceutical 
company was more motivated by the financial bottom line than public health.  Indeed, 
Larry Gostin, an expert in public health law from Georgetown University told 
National Public Radio reporter Brenda Wilson that “this, what seems to me to be a 
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steamroller effort, makes me very uncomfortable because it’s being pushed so hard 
by the company itself, which stands to make a lot of money” (Wilson 2007, para. 4).  
Gostin’s sentiments are not unwarranted as experts predict that Gardasil sales could 
net Merck between $1.6 and $2 billion dollars annually by 2009 (Smith 2006).  
Making the vaccine mandatory, at a price of approximately $360 per dose, could 
increase those projected profits (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006). 
With the negative press and growing scrutiny, in February 2007, Merck 
announced that it would end its campaign for mandatory vaccinations.  Mary 
Elizabeth Blake, public affairs official, released a statement saying that “We do not 
want any misperception about Merck’s role to distract from the ultimate goal of 
fighting cervical cancer, so Merck has re-evaluated its approach at the state level and 
we will not lobby for school requirements for Gardasil” (Childs 2007, para. 9).  
Company spokesperson, Richard Haupt, did say, however, that Merck would continue 
to promote education about the vaccine through “legislators, health departments and 
coalition groups in various states” (Reuters 2007, para. 8).  Since that time, many 
state legislatures that had considered bills to make the vaccine mandatory withdrew 
the legislation, voted it down, or let it die in committee.  As of April 2008, only 
Virginia had passed a compulsory mandate.  Even so, the Virginia legislature 





Money and Morality 
The flurry of state legislative activity that surrounded the HPV vaccination 
provokes several questions.  First, what incited such widespread legislative action?  
One possible explanation lies in the Merck campaign.  What role did Merck play in 
facilitating the proposal and adoption of policy across the 50 states?  Specifically, did 
Merck’s campaign contributions launch the HPV vaccine onto state legislative 
agendas?  Second, why did states back away from this legislation so quickly?  Did 
policymakers respond to the increased salience and the mobilization of opposition 
based on moral concerns?   
The intersection of morality politics and strong moneyed interest characterizes 
the HPV vaccine debate.  Because morality politics are typically highly salient issues, 
and moneyed interests tend to fare better in legislative politics when there is low 
salience and opposition, Merck was walking a fine line.  Schattschneider (1960) 
theorized about this type of environment, noting that groups have an incentive to 
minimize the scope of the conflict so as not to entice opposing voices into the debate.  
As salience built around the HPV issue, especially after the revelation that Merck had 
ties to Women in Government (Associated Press 2007, para. 7; Gold 2007), the scope 
became so large that Merck eventually withdrew from the conflict, stopping all 
lobbying (Associated Press 2007). 
Despite the end result, Merck is not the first organized interest group to work 
to have its goals added to the policy agenda.  In fact, efforts to influence legislative 
action have been fruitful as governments “continue to respond to groups that clearly 
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communicate their interests and have the funding to convey their messages 
effectively” (Loomis and Cigler 2007, 1).  There are a variety of tactics and strategies 
that organized interests employ to impact policy including lobbying, grassroots 
efforts, media appeals, and contributing to campaigns (DeGregorio and Rossotti 
1995).  The strategy that a particular group chooses is influenced by the resources 
available to the group and the political context.  In the case of the HPV vaccine, 
Merck chose a lobbying and campaign contribution strategy (Wilson 2007).  
Scholarship examining just how much of an impact organized interests can have on 
policy outcome is mixed.  Scholars do agree that campaign contributions are linked to 
access to political actors (Wright 1989; Schlozman and Tierney 1986) and money is 
often used to “afford favored access on matters involving direct economic benefits to 
givers” (Adamany 1980, 596).  Thus, Merck stood to gain a large profit with the 
passage of mandatory vaccination legislation. 
 The newness of the issue may have given Merck an initial advantage in 
influencing state policy.  Haider-Markel (1999) notes that groups can have more 
impact when issues are in their infancy because policymakers may not have formed 
strong beliefs.  Under these circumstances, legislators rely more heavily on 
information provided from organized interest when making their individual decisions 
(Haider-Markel 1999).  Legislative activity surrounding the HPV vaccine gives 
support to this idea.  Almost immediately after FDA approval of Gardasil in June 
2006, Merck began its campaign, and only three months later, Michigan became the 
first legislature to propose compulsory vaccination for girls entering sixth grade 
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(NCSL 2008).  The literature seems to suggest that the initial success of the Merck 
campaign could have been due to the freshness of this issue.    
 However, looking at the actions of Merck & Co. solely as an organized 
interest seeking to influence favorable policy outcomes is inadequate.  Because HPV 
is a sexually transmitted infection, policy concerning this particular vaccine addresses 
consequences of sexual behavior and naturally evokes discussions of sexuality and 
premarital sexual activity.  Therefore, the nature of the HPV vaccine debate places it 
in the morality politics arena where political actors seek to regulate social behaviors 
and redistribute values (Meier 1994).  The HPV issue is clearly situated between 
several competing interests including Merck’s desire to profit from the sale of 
Gardasil, the public health interest to prevent HPV and cervical cancer, and the 
concern that such a vaccine would increase promiscuity among young girls.   
  Mooney and Lee (2000) outline two types of morality issues—consensus and 
contentious.  Consensus issues have a clear “sin” element to them such as drinking 
and driving or gambling (Meier 1994; Sharp 2002).  Contentious issues, on the other 
hand, involve moral arguments on several fronts, each claiming “moral supremacy on 
the issue” (Doan 2007, 11).  The HPV debate seems to be situated in the latter 
category with the moral debate of preventing disease being pitted against regulating 
the sexual choices of adolescent girls.  Merck’s ability to impact state legislation 
seems to be rooted in the fact that it was able to avoid the contentious nature of 
morality politics in the early stages.  As previously noted, by April 2008, 25 states 
had proposed mandatory vaccination of young girls and many other states were 
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considering other forms of legislation to provide information about or to fund the 
vaccinations (NCSL 2008).  Despite Merck’s initial advantage, ultimately only one 
state, Virginia, passed a compulsory vaccination policy, and even it is considering 
overturning this legislation (NCSL 2008).    
 One factor that characterizes contentious morality politics issues is high 
salience (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996).  Because morality issues, despite their 
inherent complexity, are often boiled down into a simple, understandable debate, they 
are highly accessible to the public (Doan 2007; Mooney and Lee 1995).  These high 
levels of public attention tend to leave little room for expert knowledge, and when 
salience is high, citizens have more influence on public policy outcomes (Meier 
1994).  Smith (1995) notes, however, that groups can influence policymaking 
decisions when there is low salience and when the group’s efforts are unopposed.  
These conditions of low salience and lack of opposition appear to have been met early 
in Merck’s campaign to state legislatures.  As other groups became mobilized against 
the vaccine including religious groups and some medical professionals, the salience 
surrounding the push for a mandatory vaccine increased (Wilson 2007).  This 
mobilization is often easily achieved in morality politics as coalitions tend to organize 
around “preexisting religious beliefs” (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996, 334). 
 In morality politics there is little room for compromise or finding a middle 
ground (Peters 2007).  As such, when new issues emerge, opposing factions vie for 
control of the problem definition (Rochefort and Cobb 1994).  When the HPV 
vaccine became available, Merck framed the issue as a solution to a public health 
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crisis, perhaps realizing that characterizing the severity of HPV and cervical cancer 
was key to defining the issue (Rochefort and Cobb 1994).  Garnering support from 
key players such as Women in Government, Merck was successful in framing the 
debate in its favor, prompting 41 states to propose legislation promoting the new 
vaccine.  Less than half of these proposals resulted in new policy, begging us to ask 
what derailed Merck’s efforts.  Did the growing salience of the issue open the door 
for new stakeholders to redefine the issue?    
Methods 
The HPV vaccination issue provides an opportunity to investigate state 
legislative decision-making when economic, morality, and public health 
considerations intersect.  State HPV legislation can be broken down into three main 
categories: mandatory vaccination, information distribution, and enhanced access 
policies.  The most aggressive category is legislation that requires girls to be 
vaccinated in order to attend school.  As of April 2008, only Virginia had passed such 
legislation.1  Twenty-five states, however, had proposed legislation to make the HPV 
vaccination compulsory including California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
                                                 
1 The Virginia legislature introduced a bill in 2008 that would delay the requirement of the HPV 
vaccination (National Conference of State Legislatures 2008).   
 10
Carolina, Texas,2 Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (National Conference of 
State Legislatures 2008; Women in Government 2008).   
 The second category of state legislation is informational.  States have 
proposed and passed legislation requiring the dissemination of information on the 
HPV vaccination and the link between HPV and cervical cancer to girls entering 
either the fifth or sixth grades and their parents.  As of April 2008, 25 states including 
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and Wisconsin had proposed such legislation.  Of those 25, only 12 
passed legislation (NCLS 2008; Women in Government 2008). 
 The final category of state legislation involves access to the vaccination.  State 
legislatures across the United States have proposed and passed legislation to increase 
access to the HPV vaccination by either requiring the vaccination to be covered by 
Medicaid, state benefits, and/or insurance companies, or by having state funds cover 
part or all of the vaccination costs.  As of April 2008, 28 states had proposed and 9 
had passed such legislation (National Conference of State Legislatures 2008; Women 
in Government 2008).  A summary of all proposed and passed legislation can be seen 
in Table 1.   
 
                                                 
2 The Texas governor had signed an executive order making the HPV vaccine compulsory, but the 
legislature passed a law to override the order.  The governor did not veto the override bill (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2008). 
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Table 1: HPV Vaccine Policies Proposed and Passed  

















Alabama      
Alaska      
Arizona  X  X  
Arkansas    X  
California X   X X 
Colorado X X X X X 
Connecticut X X  X  
Delaware      
Florida X X  X  
Georgia X   X  
Hawaii  X  X  
Idaho      
Illinois X X X X X 
Indiana  X X   
Iowa  X X X  
Kansas X X    
Kentucky X X  X  
Louisiana      
Maine X X X X X 
Maryland X     
Massachusetts X   X  
Michigan X X    
Minnesota X X    
Mississippi X   X  
Missouri X X  X  
Montana  X    
Nebraska      
Nevada    X X 
New Hampshire    X X 
New Jersey  X X X  
New Mexico X X  X X 
New York X X  X  
North Carolina  X X   
North Dakota  X X   
Ohio X   X  
Oklahoma X     
Oregon    X  
Pennsylvania  X  X  
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South Carolina X     
South Dakota    X X 
Tennessee      
Texas X X X X  
Utah  X X   
Vermont X   X  
Virginia X   X  
Washington  X X   
West Virginia X     
Wisconsin X X X   
Wyoming      
Totals 25 25 12 28 9 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL 2008) and Women in Government 
(2008) 
 
 Based on these three categories of legislation, I test five statistical models 
designed to examine the relative influence of economic, morality, and public health 
factors on HPV legislation.  The first model examines states that have proposed 
making the HPV vaccination compulsory.  States that have proposed legislation are 
coded one, and all others are coded as zero.  Because only one state has actually 
passed legislation to make the vaccine mandatory, I do not model this relationship.  
The second and third models look at states that have proposed and passed legislation 
mandating dissemination of information to children and their parents.  States who 
have either proposed or passed legislation are coded one, and all others are coded 
zero.  The fourth and fifth models examine states that have proposed and passed 
legislation to improve access to the HPV vaccine, respectively.  States who have 
passed or proposed legislation are coded one, and all others are coded zero.  
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Economic Considerations  
 Each of the models examines three categories of considerations in the HPV 
vaccination debate including economic, morality, and public health.  Because interest 
group contributions have been linked to favored access to policymakers (Adamany 
1980), it is necessary to examine the impact of Merck contributions.  Therefore, the 
primary economic variable measures contributions from Merck pharmaceutical 
company, makers of the HPV vaccine, Gardasil.  This variable is measured by the 
total dollar amount of contributions given to candidates for state offices in 2006.  
Because states with larger legislatures would have more candidates running for office, 
and thus could attract more contributions, the total dollar amount is divided by the 
number of members of the state legislature.  Merck contributions were gathered from 
the National Institute on Money in State Politics (2008).  Merck contributions are 
expected to be positively associated with all three types of legislation.   
 Other economic concerns include the percent of uninsured women within a 
state.  If states were to pass legislation to either make the vaccine mandatory or to 
expand access to the vaccine, the cost of vaccination would either fall to insurance 
companies or to the states.  This variable is a proxy measure designed to capture the 
potential economic costs of enacting such legislation and is expected to be negatively 
related to all types of HPV legislation.  For these same reasons, population is another 
important variable to include in the model.  Larger populations could indicate a 
stronger need for a solution to the HPV problem or alternatively a large economic 
market for Merck.  I expect that states with larger populations will be more likely to 
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pass all three types of legislation.  The percent of urban population in a state is the 
final economic consideration in these models.  Because low-income, urban young 
women are at a higher risk for HPV and other sexually transmitted diseases (Bunnell 
et al. 1999), states with larger urban populations may see higher urban populations as 
an economic burden.  It is expected that states with smaller percentages of uninsured 
women will be more likely to propose and pass all three types of HPV vaccine 
legislation.  The percent of uninsured women, population, and the percent of urban 
population highlight the economic costs of a solution.  As Rochefort and Cobb (1994, 
26) point out, although a solution to a public problem may be available, political 
actors may not “perceive that adequate resources exist to pay for what needs to be 
done.”   
Morality Considerations 
To assess the impact of morality politics on the HPV legislation, several 
additional indicators are included in the models.  Those who wish to see the HPV 
vaccination become mandatory have seen some opposition from Christian 
conservative activists (Gold 2007).  Therefore, the percent of the population within a 
state that identify as Christian using data from the 2000 US Census Bureau is 
included in the models.  Larger Christian populations within a state are expected to be 
negatively associated with proposing and passing all types of legislation.  Ideology 
has also been linked to political decisions at both the individual level and at the 
government level (Minar 1961).   
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Since numerous studies have shown that citizens tend to elect representatives 
that share their viewpoints (Berry et al. 2002) measures of both citizen ideology and 
government ideology are included in the models.  It is expected that states with more 
liberal citizens and governments will be more likely to propose and pass HPV vaccine 
policies.  Although citizen and government ideology are important in legislative 
decision-making, the level of electoral competition also influences whether 
policymakers are willing to take risks on their political stances (Holbrook and Van 
Dunk 1993).  It is expected that states with low electoral competition will be more 
likely to propose and pass HPV policies because when competition is low, legislators 
have more freedom to take sides on contentious issues without fear of electoral 
repercussions.  Conversely, when competition is high, policymakers may be more 
inclined to avoid strong stances that could hurt them in future elections.  Furthermore, 
with contentious and salient morality politics issues, legislators tend to pay closer 
attention to public opinion (Meier 1994; Norrander and Wilcox 2005).   
Legislative professionalism is another important consideration in these 
models.  Squire (2007) notes that more professional legislatures are able to devote 
more time to policy research and development.  As such, we would expect that more 
professional legislatures would be able to devote more time to understanding the 
complexity of the HPV vaccine debate rather than viewing it in terms of more 
simplistic morality arguments.  I expect that more professional legislatures will be 
more likely to propose and pass all three types of legislation.  The final indicator of 
morality in the models is the number of female legislators in each state legislature.   
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Because Women in Government was a significant supporter of HPV vaccination 
policies, including policies to make it mandatory for school-aged girls, and because 
cervical cancer is an issue that is salient to women, I expect that states with more 
female legislators will be more likely to propose and pass all types of HPV policies.   
Public Health Considerations 
The final set of considerations in the HPV debate includes issues of public 
health, namely the rates of cervical cancer and cervical cancer mortality in a state3.  
The number of women who have either developed or died from this particular type of 
cancer is included in the models because 99 percent of all cervical cancer has been 
linked to the HPV virus.  Data on the incidence and mortality rates were collected 
from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Program of Cancer 
Registry (nd).  The data is listed per 100,000 and includes incidence and mortality 
rates for 2004.  Because states with higher incidence rates have a stronger need for a 
solution, I expect that these measures will be positively associated with proposing and 
passing HPV legislation.  I employ logistic regression to estimate the models because 
each dependent variable is dichotomous.  Wallace and Silver (1988) suggest routinely 
estimating robust standard errors to correct for potential problems of 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation.  More recently, Angrist and Pischke (2008), 
recommend estimating both regular and robust standard errors and reporting the more 
conservative estimations.  When comparing the robust and regular standard errors, 
there was no substantive difference in the results of the models.   
                                                 
3 Although it may appear that there could be colinearity between these two measures, diagnostic tests 
revealed no such problems with the data. 
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Results  
Mandatory Vaccination Model 
The results from the first model testing the likelihood of states to propose 
legislation making the HPV vaccine compulsory can be seen in Table 2.  Turning first 
to the economic considerations, the primary independent variable, Merck 
contributions, yielded a statistically significant result, but not in the expected 
direction.  States that had higher amounts of contributions per legislator were 
significantly less likely to propose legislation requiring girls to be vaccinated before 
entering school.  Population also had a strong, positive impact suggesting that states 
with larger populations were more likely to propose such legislation.  The results of 
the model also indicate, however, as the percent of urban population increases, the 
probability that a state would propose compulsory vaccination legislation decreased.     
 Examining the morality considerations in the HPV vaccination debate, the 
model indicates that citizen ideology was a positive indicator of proposing mandatory 
vaccination legislation.  As a state’s ideology became more liberal, the likelihood of 
proposing legislation increased.  Legislative professionalism performed the same 
way, suggesting that as professionalism increased, the likelihood of proposing 
legislation increased.  Conversely, electoral competition appears to decrease the 
likelihood of a state proposing a mandatory vaccination mandate.  
The final two variables address the public health considerations in the HPV 
vaccination debate.  The rate of cervical cancer incidence in a state has a strong, 
positive impact on proposing legislation.  States that had higher incidence rates of 
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cervical cancer were statistically more likely to propose legislation.  Cervical cancer 
mortality rates were also a strong predictor, but in the opposite direction.   
 
Table 2: Proposed Compulsory Vaccine for School Admission 
Independent Variables β Probability mfx 
Economic Considerations    
 Merck Contribution -.020 (.009) .026 -.004 
 Percent Uninsured Women -.042 (.209) .839  
 Population .000 (.000) .016 .000 
 Percent Urban -.190 (.086) .028 -.046 
    
Morality Considerations    
 Percent Christian -.027 (.062) .662  
 Citizen Ideology .194 (.104) .062 .046 
 Government Ideology -.034 (.029) .242  
 Electoral Competition -.174 (.077) .024 -.042 
 Legislative Professionalism 14.987 (6.698) .025 3.618 
 Female Legislators .029 (.020) .146  
    
Public Health Considerations    
 Cervical Cancer Incidence 4.218 (1.242) .001 1.018 
 Cervical Cancer Mortality -9.137 (2.185) .000 -2.206 
    
Constant -2.225 (10.667) .835  
    
Number of Cases 49   
Wald χ2 29.36 .003  
Pseudo R2 .64   
Log Pseudolikelihood -12.065   
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Marginal effects (mfx) are estimated after a logistic 
regression estimation, where the values of the independent variables are set to the mean or the 
mode. 
 
Table 2 also presents the marginal effects coefficients4 for the model.  
Marginal effects coefficients are post-estimation calculations that give the probability 
                                                 
4 The marginal effects coefficients are located in the column labeled “mfx.” 
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slope, holding all other variables constant (Long 1997; Long and Freese 2005).  
Marginal effects coefficients can be compared to determine the relative impact of 
each variable on the dependent variable.  In this model, legislative professionalism 
appears to be having the most significant positive impact on the probability of a state 
proposing a compulsory vaccination, followed by cervical cancer incidence, citizen 
ideology, and population.  The most important negative impact comes from cervical 
cancer mortality rates, followed by percent urban, electoral competition, and finally 
Merck contributions.  So while Merck contributions had a statistically significant, 
negative impact on proposing this policy, cervical cancer mortality rates were more 
important. 
Information Distribution Models 
The second model examined states that proposed legislation requiring that 
information about the HPV virus and its connection to cervical cancer be distributed 
to children and their parents.  Unlike the mandatory vaccination model, the results in 
Table 3 indicate that this information dissemination model performed poorly.   
 Turning to the third model, which examines states that passed information 
legislation, we see that Merck contributions had a statistically significant, negative 
impact.  As in the first model, Merck contributions had the opposite effect of what 
was hypothesized.  In the states where legislators received more Merck contributions, 
policymakers were less likely to pass legislation requiring the distribution of HPV 
vaccine information.  Population also produced a significant result, indicating that 
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states with higher populations were more likely to pass this type of policy.  The other 
economic considerations did not significantly impact state decision-making.   
 
Table 3: Proposed Information Distribution to Children and Parents 
Independent Variables β Probability mfx 
Economic Considerations    
 Merck Contribution -.006 (.004) .168  
 Percent Uninsured Women -.035 (.140) .801  
 Population .000 (.000) .142  
 Percent Urban .008 (.032) .787  
    
Morality Considerations    
 Percent Christian .029 (.046) .526  
 Citizen Ideology .025 (.027) .355  
 Government Ideology -.028 (.020) .154  
 Electoral Competition .042 (.048) .373  
 Legislative Professionalism -4.194 (4.714) .374  
 Female Legislators .014 (.023) .543  
    
Public Health Considerations    
 Cervical Cancer Incidence .473 (.400) .237  
 Cervical Cancer Mortality -1.343 (1.245) .280  
    
Constant -4.128 (6.628) .533  
    
Number of Cases 49   
Wald χ2 12.45 .4106  
Pseudo R2 .2186   
Log Pseudolikelihood -26.530   
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Marginal effects (mfx) are estimated after a logistic 
regression estimation, where the values of the independent variables are set to the mean or the 
mode. 
 
Examining the influence of morality considerations, the results indicated that 
electoral competition was the only statistically significant variable.  The analysis 
suggests that states that have higher electoral competition were more likely to pass 
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this legislation.  In this model, no other morality consideration, or the variables 
measuring public health considerations, achieved statistical significance.  In terms of 
relative impact, the marginal effects coefficients suggest that electoral competition 
had the most significant impact on whether or not states passed HPV information 
legislation.  The full set of results for the third model can be seen in Table 4.   
 
Table 4: Passed Information Distribution to Children and Parents 
Independent Variables β Probability mfx 
Economic Considerations    
 Merck Contribution -.016 (.006) .007 -.001 
 Percent Uninsured Women .128 (.109) .241  
 Population .000 (.000) .007 .000 
 Percent Urban -.035 (.039) .365  
    
Morality Considerations    
 Percent Christian .085 (.054) .118  
 Citizen Ideology -.035 (.031) .271  
 Government Ideology .037 (.026) .159  
 Electoral Competition .115 (.053) .031 .013 
 Legislative Professionalism -6.395 (7.246) .378  
 Female Legislators .002 (.018) .894  
    
Public Health Considerations    
 Cervical Cancer Incidence .091 (.383) .812  
 Cervical Cancer Mortality -1.309 (1.520) .389  
    
Constant -7.763 (7.268) .285  
    
Number of Cases 49   
Wald χ2 20.30 .061  
Pseudo R2 .310   
Log Pseudolikelihood -18.795   
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Marginal effects (mfx) are estimated after a logistic 




Enhanced Access Models 
 The fourth and fifth models examined states that proposed and passed 
legislation to enhance access to the HPV vaccine, respectively.  The results for the 
fourth model can be seen in Table 5. 
  
Table 5: Proposed Legislation to Enhance Access to HPV Vaccine  
Independent Variables β Probability mfx 
Economic Considerations    
 Merck Contribution .003 (.004) .465  
 Percent Uninsured Women -.046 (.109) .667  
 Population .000 (.000) .514  
 Percent Urban .033 (.028) .247  
    
Morality Considerations    
 Percent Christian -.006 (.030) .837  
 Citizen Ideology .074 (.038) .0557 .017 
 Government Ideology -.017 (.020) .386  
 Electoral Competition -.063 (.045) .163  
 Legislative Professionalism -2.664 (4.736) .574  
 Female Legislators .016 (.015) .285  
    
Public Health Considerations    
 Cervical Cancer Incidence .147 (.460) .749  
 Cervical Cancer Mortality .148 (1.229) .904  
    
Constant -3.431 (5.525) .535  
    
Number of Cases 49   
Wald χ2 14.21 .287  
Pseudo R2 .238   
Log Pseudolikelihood -25.483   
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Marginal effects (mfx) are estimated after a logistic 




 The results show that citizen ideology was the only significant predictor of 
proposing such legislation.  Those states that had a more liberal citizen ideology were 
more likely to propose enhancing access.  No other variables produced statistically 
significant relationships. 
 
Table 6: Passed Legislation to Enhance Access to HPV Vaccine  
Independent Variables β Probability mfx 
Economic Considerations    
 Merck Contribution .006 (.005) .254  
 Percent Uninsured Women .090 (.148) .544  
 Population -.000 (.000) .684  
 Percent Urban .042 (.045) .343  
    
Morality Considerations    
 Percent Christian .018 (.048) .705  
 Citizen Ideology .049 (.033) .148  
 Government Ideology -.008 (.023) .699  
 Electoral Competition .053 (.058) .362  
 Legislative Professionalism -5.529 (6.505) .395  
 Female Legislators .034 (.019) .072 .003 
    
Public Health Considerations    
 Cervical Cancer Incidence -.247 (.668) .711  
 Cervical Cancer Mortality .932 (2.184) .670  
    
Constant -12.120 (10.489) .248  
    
Number of Cases 49   
Wald χ2 12.61 .398  
Pseudo R2 .182   
Log Pseudolikelihood -19.104   
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Marginal effects (mfx) are estimated after a logistic 




Results for the fifth model can be seen in Table 6.  States with more female 
legislators were more likely to pass legislation to enhance access to the HPV vaccine.  
Aside from this morality variable, no other statistically significant economic, 
morality, or public health relationships were revealed in this model. 
Discussion 
 The results of the analyses uncovered some intuitive as well as surprising 
results.  The most intriguing results appeared in the realm of the economic 
considerations.  Most notable is the impact of Merck contributions.  In the first and 
third models, Merck contributions were a significant predictor of the dependent 
variables to propose compulsory voting and pass informational legislation, 
respectively.  The relationships, however, were in the opposite direction than 
expected.  In both of these models, as Merck contributions increased, the likelihood 
of a state taking action decreased.  Although this seems counterintuitive, these results 
could be explained by the severe backfire of the Merck lobbying techniques and 
subsequent loss of issue framing.  By February 2007, Merck ended its campaign to 
push for mandatory vaccination of school-age girls after coming under scrutiny.  
While Merck dominated the debate early on, as salience about the HPV vaccine 
began to grow, the pharmaceutical company began to lose control over the issue.  
With the growing salience, other stakeholders entered the debate, primarily those who 
wished to frame the debate as a morality issue.  These opponents to the vaccine 
worried that vaccination would promote promiscuity among young girls (Childs 
2007; Reuters 2007; Wilson 2007; Gold 2007).      
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 Population is the other economic consideration that achieved statistical 
significance.  When considering whether states proposed mandatory vaccination or 
passed legislation to provide HPV vaccination information, increased population 
enhanced the likelihood that states would act.  Although this is in the opposite 
direction than hypothesized, it could be that states with larger populations may have 
perceived a stronger need for a solution to the HPV problem.  Conversely, states with 
higher urban populations were less likely to propose mandatory vaccination.  Because 
low-income, urban young women are at a higher risk for HPV and other sexually 
transmitted diseases (Bunnell et al. 1999), states with larger urban populations may 
have seen a mandatory vaccination program as an economic burden.        
 The results also suggest that morality played a minor role in HPV state 
policymaking.  It is interesting to note that states with a higher percentage of people 
who identified as Christian were no more likely to propose or pass legislation dealing 
with the HPV vaccine.  Although I anticipated that states with a higher Christian 
presence would be less likely to propose or pass policies concerning the HPV 
vaccination, we can find some explanation for these results.  Although certain 
conservative groups actively opposed the HPV vaccination, Focus on the Family and 
the Family Research Council “recently have spoken in support of HPV vaccines from 
Merck and GlaxoSmithKline because of their life-saving potential” (Smith 2006, 
para. 21).  They do, however, maintain the position that the best method to prevent 
HPV and cervical cancer is abstinence and monogamy.  This support, albeit weak 
 26
support, may be sending a mixed message to Christians, and thus could explain the 
lack of significance of this particular variable. 
 Citizen ideology had a significant, positive impact on states proposing 
mandatory HPV vaccination and proposing increased access to the vaccination.  As 
the state’s citizenry became more liberal, the likelihood of proposing these policies 
increased.  This result was expected because liberal ideology is associated with 
enhanced social services (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999).  Another morality 
consideration that seemed to play a role in state activity surrounding the HPV vaccine 
is electoral competition.  In the first model looking at mandatory vaccination, 
electoral competition had a negative impact on proposing the legislation.  As electoral 
competition increased, support for legislation decreased.  Making the vaccine 
mandatory for school-age girls was the most contentious and aggressive approach to 
the HPV issue.  Because compulsory vaccination was met with debate from both 
ideological and public health perspectives, it is intuitive that legislators in states with 
more competitive elections would be less likely to take such an aggressive, politically 
risky stance (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993).  The analysis suggests that 
policymakers may have been paying more attention to public opinion in an effort to 
avoid alienating voters in future elections.  In the model examining states that passed 
policies to disperse information about the HPV vaccination, however, electoral 
competition increased the likelihood that states would pass such a policy.  Although 
this is opposite of what was hypothesized, the result could be explained by the fact 
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that distributing information about the HPV vaccine was a less aggressive and 
contentious approach than mandatory vaccination.        
 Legislative professionalism is another morality consideration that was 
significant in the first model.  As hypothesized, as a state’s legislative professionalism 
increased, so did the probability of proposing mandatory vaccination legislation.  The 
final variable in the morality domain is female legislators.  The role of female 
legislators was only significant in the final model looking at states that passed 
policies to enhance access to the HPV vaccine.  In this model we see that more 
female legislators translated into more initiatives to enhance access to the vaccine.  
This could be due in part to the role of Women in Government, especially noting that 
much of this legislation was introduced by members of this organization (Associated 
Press 2007).  Further study should examine the relationship between the lobbying 
efforts of Women in Government and HPV legislation within the states.   
The final dimension of the HPV vaccine debate is public health, measured by 
cervical cancer incidence and cervical cancer mortality rates.  Interestingly, these two 
measures were only significant in the first model examining states that proposed 
mandatory vaccination.  The fact that public health only affected state legislation 
when it came to compulsory vaccination is interesting in of itself.  The results suggest 
that enhanced need did not significantly influence states to either propose or pass 
information-dispensing policies or enhanced access policies.  Cervical cancer 
incidence rates did increase the probability of a state proposing mandatory 
vaccination legislation.  Cervical cancer mortality rates, however, had the opposite 
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effect.  Because cervical cancer is treatable, increased mortality rates are often 
indicative of low access to health care and poverty (Freeman and Wingrove 2005).  
Mandatory vaccination would be costly for a state to provide, and large populations 
of individuals with low access to health care could be seen as an economic burden.   
There are some limitations to this research.  The first, and most obvious, is the 
lack of data on the lobbying efforts of Merck.  While campaign contributions can 
serve as a good proxy for the attention of a group on a particular state, it is not a 
perfect measurement.  Much of what is contributed depends on the number of 
candidates running for office as well as campaign finance laws.  I also found that 
some states received no campaign contributions from Merck, including Michigan, 
which was the first state to propose compulsory legislation (National Conference of 
State Legislatures 2008).  Further investigation should investigate why some states 
seemed to be ignored.  Future research should also examine campaign contributions 
over time from Merck to see if there is a pattern between states that receive more 
funds and favorable legislation toward Merck.   
Conclusion 
 The primary goal of this paper was to understand the state legislative action 
on the HPV vaccination issue.  More specifically, examine why so many states rushed 
to place the HPV vaccination on their legislative agendas and then so quickly back 
away.  To dissect this puzzle, I first explored the HPV vaccine debate.  This 
exploration revealed the critical role that Merck played in launching HPV onto the 
legislative agenda.  Turning then to literature on the role of interest groups in 
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policymaking especially in the realm of morality politics, I explored conditions 
necessary for Merck & Co. to be successful in influencing policymaking.  Through 
several statistical models, I examined the outcome of state legislative activity when 
economic, morality, and public health considerations intersect.   
The results indicate that while contributions to individual legislators did have 
an impact on legislation, increased contributions actually decreased the likelihood 
that a state would either introduce or pass legislation.  These results seem to suggest 
that Merck’s lobbying efforts were not successful in influencing policy outcomes.  
While Merck may have had success in early stages of agenda setting, once its 
campaign contribution efforts were publicized, the pharmaceutical company’s efforts 
actually decreased the likelihood for a favorable policy response.  While Merck’s 
economic interests seemed to dominate the earlier stages of the policymaking process, 
increased awareness invited a host of morality opponents to the decision-making 
table.  As the analyses suggest, when the HPV debate took on a morality perspective, 
Merck’s influence was stunted.  Public health concerns also had relatively little 
influence on state decision-making.  Only one analysis suggested that rates of cervical 
cancer influenced a state to propose policies on HPV vaccination.  The results of this 
analysis indicate that when morality politics intervene, they have the ability to 
destabilize an issue.  Although Merck and public health concerns may have lead 41 
states to propose numerous pieces of legislation to introduce the HPV vaccine as a 
policy solution, morality interests influenced states to back away from strong 
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legislation.  Some states opted for more mild approaches to the HPV vaccine, and 
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Variable Coding and Sources 
Variable Source Coding 
Merck Contributions National Institute on Money in State Politics 
Total $ given to candidates 
in 2006 in a state divided by 
the total number of state 
legislators. 
Percent Uninsured 
Women American Cancer Society 
Percentage of uninsured 
women in each state. 
Population 2006 US Census Bureau Number in thousands. 
Percent Urban 2000 US Census Bureau Percent of population that liven in urban areas in 2000. 
Percent Christian 2000 US Census Bureau Percent of population that identify as Christian in 2000. 
Citizen Ideology 2002 Berry et al. (1998) 100 = Perfectly Liberal 0 = Perfectly Conservative 
Government Ideology 2002 Berry et al. (1998) 100 = Perfectly Liberal 0 = Perfectly Conservative 
Electoral Competition Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) 100 = Perfect Competition 0 = No Competition 
Legislative 
Professionalism Squire (2007) 
Range from 0 to 1. 
1 = More Professional 
0 = Less Professional 
Female Legislators Center for American Women and Politics 
Number of female legislators 




Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention National Program of 
Cancer Registry 
Rate per 100,000 in 2004. 
Cervical Cancer 
Mortality 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention National Program of 
Cancer Registry 
Rate per 100,000 in 2004. 
 
 
